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Abstract
Quantification of historical sociological processes have recently gained attention among theoreticians in the effort of
providing a solid theoretical understanding of the behaviors and regularities present in socio-political dynamics. Here we
present a reliability theory of polity processes with emphases on individual political dynamics of African countries. We found
that the structural properties of polity failure rates successfully capture the risk of political vulnerability and instabilities in
which 87:50%, 75%, 71:43%, and 0% of the countries with monotonically increasing, unimodal, U-shaped and
monotonically decreasing polity failure rates, respectively, have high level of state fragility indices. The quasi-U-shape
relationship between average polity duration and regime types corroborates historical precedents and explains the stability
of the autocracies and democracies.
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Introduction
Beginning with the Berlin Conference in 1884 – leading to the
colonial despotism, to the National Conference of 1989 in Benin
– marking the beginning of the democratic renewal, Africa
continues to experience various patterns of political-economic
regulations, mostly shifting away from autocratic regimes and
toward more open governance. The continent has seen an
increasing number of incomplete transitions to democracy,
resulting in a high vulnerability to outbreaks of conflict [1–6].
Hypotheses for the proneness of the continent to conflicts
include the inherent contradictions of being both partly open
and repressive, the political incoherencies associated with
anocratic (semi-democratic) regimes, economic underdevelop-
ment, poor managerial styles, and ethnic politics and polariza-
tion [7–15]. However, in the past decades, there has been fewer
political instabilities in anocratic regimes than predicted by
historical data and previous studies. Here we develop a simple
model of polity duration that explains historical data, and shows
t h a tt h er i s ko fp o l i t yc h a n g ed e p e n d so nt h es t r u c t u r a l
properties of polity failure rates. Three cliophysical parameters
[16] quantifying the properties of the risk of political
vulnerabilities are estimated from the data, and are used to
provide a scientific understanding of the underlying mechanisms
of regime stability. We call this socio-political reliability theory,
and it has relevant implications for policy evaluations and
designs.
Political processes within Africa have been characterized by
waves of political instabilities, economic under-performances and
other social factors with more than half of the sub-Saharan
countries having experienced some forms of state-formation and/
or post-independence civil conflicts since 1960, making the
continent a testbed for exploring the determinants of political
instabilities and state failures. As a result, we have seen an upsurge
of literature addressing the causes of civil wars and political
unrests. Understanding the causes and consequences of these civil
conflicts have been a focus for most of the recent social science
research, in particular sociological, political and economic
inquiries with in-depth studies highlighting the role of economic
under-development and economic grievances in shaping risks of
conflicts as illustrated by the works of Auvinen [1], Hauge and
Ellingsen [12], and Collier et al. [5]; of monarchical tendency,
oppression of minority groups and repressive managerial styles of
african leaders as exemplified by the works of Francisco [9],
Lichbach [17], and Moore [18]; of the ethno-linguistic and
religious diversity, ethnic fractionalization, political polarization,
favoritism and nepotism as identified by the works of Ellingsen [7],
Horowitz [15], Gurr [10], Lichbach [19] and Vanhanen [20]; and
comparatively, of the historical precedents in the works of Bratton
and van de Walle [2], Ellingsen and Gleditsch [8], Hibbs [14],
Huntington [6], and Muller and Weede [21]. Some of these
scholarly works have provided insights into the subtleties of socio-
political processes underlying the historical precedents and
constraints affecting the effectiveness of Africa’s political behaviors,
and have resulted in accumulation of empirical data and studies.
Despite these accumulations of empirical knowledge, theoretical
contributions linking the polity dynamics, risk of political
instabilities, and scientific understanding of the processes have
been modest. In this paper, we provide quantitative evidence
linking the structural properties of polity failure rates to variations
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between state fragility indices and the functional shape of polity
failure rates.
Materials and Methods
The model described herein links the levels of democracy, polity
durations and properties associated with the risk of regime failure.
To quantify the relationship between the polity duration and
regime type, we use the polity score from the Polity IV data set
[22], a scaled metric that measures regime governance and the
extent to which countries are democratic. The score ranges start
from {10 for fully autocratic to 10 for fully democratic, and was
originally developed by Gurr and colleagues [22,23]. For our
purpose, we map the polity score from ½{10, 10]t o½0, 1 . In this
paper, we use polity duration as a mean of assessing and
measuring sociopolitical reliability, dynamics of which are affected
by various micro- and macro-sociopolitical and economic
processes (e.g., managerial style of the leaders, protests and
repressive measures to prevent riots). Possible processes that might
affect polity dynamics are the changes in the governance and/or
the structures of the government. This could be peaceful or
rebellious transition (e.g., coup d’ e ´tats). Another example in which
polity dynamics can change is in the managerial styles. That is, the
adaptation of a larger policy changes and international pressures
can influence the dynamics of polity. Governments’ attempts to
minimize its probability of collapse or to maintain law and order
can result in movements towards a repressive or an expansionary
economic measure, and/or political repression or liberation. This
in turn leads to changes in the level of democracy on the
autocratic- democratic regime spectrum, and forces the state to
move towards harshly autocratic or open governance. Polity
change serves as an aggregative dynamical quantity that can
provide some insights into the macro-sociopolitical behaviors
originating from the complex interactions between the economic,
social and political dynamics and domains. As a result analyses
presented herein focus on the dynamics of polity and its duration.
Aggregating polity levels, we found that the average polity
durations for highly autocratic and institutionally consistent
democratic regimes are longer than the anocratic ones (e.g., see
Table 1), in which autocracies (e.g., scaled polity score range
~½0,1=3 ) are estimated to be slightly longer than democracies in
statistically insignificant way. However, fully or harshly autocracies
(e.g., scaled polity score =0) have shorter average polity duration
than fully democracies (e.g., scaled polity score =1). Table 1
summarizes our results. Figure 1 shows an average duration as a
function of scaled polity score, in which anocratic regimes are
highly unstable with majority of the polities experiencing some
regime change within the first five years. The regime volatility is
inversely proportional to the average polity duration (e.g.,
Vr! 1
SDtT). That is, the shorter the polity duration, the higher
the political volatility and/or vulnerability to regime de-consoli-
dation. In other words, countries that experience higher
fluctuations in the level of polity in a short time have more
vulnerable to political instabilities and civil unrests. Our findings
corroborate this claim and the fact that both fully autocratic and
democratic regimes are more durable and stable than anocratic
regimes, and have been supported by numerous political scientists
[17,19,20,24–28]. However, we observed that anocratic regimes
have relatively experienced a fewer civil unrests leading to political
instabilities in the past decades than suggested by Table 1 and
fig. 1. To study the mechanisms that explain this, we look at the
cliometric space diagram of the shape parameters characterizing
these polity failure rates to show that the structural properties of
the polity failure rates capture the risks of political instabilities.
To explore the direct role of functional shape of polity failure
rate in explaining the historical risk of conflict and political
instabilities, we use a modified Weibull function with a dispersive
scale parameter, sw0, and cliometric shape parameters aw0 and
bw0 to characterize the distribution of polity duration, Dt:
F(Dt;s,a,b)! 1{exp {
Dt
s
   a       b
ð1Þ
where the dispersive scale parameter s is the characteristic
reference duration and is related to the mean polity duration, and
shape parameters a and b measure the susceptibility of the polity
to socio-political conditions. We use proportionality to indicate
that some of the countries do not perfectly follow the power-law
breakdown rule we have assumed in order to arrive at Eq. 1 under
a non-constant risk of polity change. The exponentiated form of
Weibull function is used due to its flexibility to assume different
structural forms with broader class of monotone hazard rate, and
it is computationally convenient. It also contains distributions with
non-monotonic structures (see [29] and references therein, and
Appendix A). For instance, depending on the values of the shape
parameters, we can approximate exponential, symmetric and
asymmetric sigmoidal shapes, step function. Its flexibility with
practical relevance and applicability have been demonstrated in
various studies in reliability theory, composite materials, and bio-
demography. Furthermore, from practical and comparative
viewpoints, Weibull approximation and its exponentiation easily
provide us a direct mean of connecting different layers of analysis
from individual countries and regional groupings to the continent.
We employ a standard analytic procedures for lifetime data for
estimating the parameters. Fitting our model to Polity IV data set
for forty-eight African countries that have sufficient data points for
our estimation problem [22,23,29,30], we then characterize the
risk of polity change by four distinct regions (e.g., see fig. 2a) in the
cliometric diagram of shape parameters a and b over which the
failure rate as a function polity duration is, respectively, increasing
monotonically (region I, e.g., Cp~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ab
p
§1 and a§1), decreasing
monotonically (region II, e.g., Cpv1 and av1), U-shaped or
bathtub-shaped (region III, e.g., Cpv1 and aw1), and unimodal
(region IV, e.g., Cpw1 and av1). The Cliometric Number,
Cp~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ab
p
is defined here as the geometric mean of the two
susceptibility (shape) parameters, and measures the initial growth
of risk at the early stage of a new polity establishment. Cpv1
indicates an initial decay in the risk of polity change, while Cp
provides an indication of a possible increase in the vulnerability of
the polity. The cliometric shape parameter a determines the
Table 1. Empirical justification of average polity duration for
different regime type from 1946-2008. rom the transformed
polity score, autocracy is a polity with a score in the range [0,
1/3], anocracy within the range [1/3, 2/3], and democracy
within the range [2/3, 1].
Regime Type Mean Polity duration, SDtTw 95% CI N
Autocracies 10.65 (9.75, 11.56) 164
Anocracies 5.04 (5.02, 5.07) 53
Democracies 10.20 (8.42, 11.99) 78
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015169.t001
Sociopolitical Reliability and (In)stabilities
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Cp§1 or av1, Cpv1) or non-monotone (aw1, Cpv1 or aw1,
Cpv1) if the direction of both a and Cp are the same or opposite,
respectively. The conditions above are based on the derivative of
the failure rate, as defined by H(Dt;s,a,b)~
F0(Dt;s,a,b)
1{F(Dt;s,a,b)
.
That is, the analysis of H0(Dt;s,a,b) or equivalently of the
transformation H0(s(logz)
1=a;s,a,b), where z~exp((Dt=s)
a)
determines the four distinct regions. Figure 2b show our empirical
summary for African continent. Interestingly, we found that the
majority of African countries have either U-shape (22% or 11
Figure 1. Level of democracy and polity durations. The figure shows the average polity duration, SDtT (years), with polities at either ends
having longer duration.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015169.g001
Figure 2. Properties of the polity failure rate or political hazard. The figures show: (a) functional type defining the risk of polity change
(failure or hazard rate) in a{b plane separated by the curves a ~1 and C
 
p~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ ﬃ
ab
p
~1; and (b) corresponding countries in Africa, as estimated by our
model using least absolute regression with Trust-Region and Levenberg-Marquardt algorithms whenever possible. Interestingly, 87.50%, 0%, 71.43%,
and 75% of African countries in regions I, II, III and IV, respectively, have extremely high state fragility indexes (c).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015169.g002
Sociopolitical Reliability and (In)stabilities
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rates.
Results and Discussion
U-shaped polity failure rate suggests that there is an initial
period of high level of uncertainty and civil unrest in a newly
formed polity, followed by a long or short constant failure rate as
dissidents are abandoned or integrated into the political system,
and/or the government satisfies the political demands of the
dissidents. However, as the loss of political legitimacy increases,
the state effectiveness decreases, and the lifetime of the polity is
prolonged, the risk of polity change is heightened due to
cumulative risks. Depending on the regime type, especially for
anocracies, this heightening of risk of polity change can easily lead
to political instability and civil unrest. For autocracies, this implies
the strengthening of repressive measures and institutions as the
regimes attempt to reduce the risks of their failures. U-shaped
polity failure rate is reminiscent of three fundamental mechanisms
driving the risk of polity change, namely the quality of governance,
socio-political and economic factors, and management styles. We
found that more than seventy percent (71.43%) of the countries
with bathtub-shape failure rates have extreme to serious level of
state fragility index (e.g., see Fig. 2c), a measure of state
effectiveness and legitimacy in the areas of security, economics,
development, and governance [22].
In contrast to U-shaped polity failure rate, we also observe that
other countries exhibit different functional properties in which the
risk of polity change initially starts low and increases to a
maximum, before decreasing with uni-modal failure rate. Twenty-
four countries have failure rates exhibiting uni-modal behaviors.
Interestingly, seventy-five percent (75%) of the countries with this
Figure 3. Polity Failure Rates. The figures show different properties for polity failure rates using estimated parameters and data sampled from
eight different countries: (a) Chad with sc~14:81, ac~1:946, bc~0:2602; (b) Gambia with sg~20:9, ag~10:22, bg~0:05641; (c) Libya with sl~26:37,
al~15:51, bl~0:07682; (d) Zimbabwe with sz~7:151, az~1:133, bz~0:8861, respectively. These parameters were estimated from empirical data
using Least Absolute Regression method with Trust-Region and Levenberg-Marquardth algorithms, and were used to generate the polity failure
rates: Chad and Gambia have U-shaped with Chad having a shorter constant failure rate and Gambia with shorter early life and longer constant polity
failure rate before the increasing cumulative damage effect stage sets take over; Libya and Zimbabwe exhibit, respectively, convex and concave
monotonically increasing failure rates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015169.g003
Sociopolitical Reliability and (In)stabilities
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increasing polity hazard has the largest number of countries with
more than eighty-seven percents (87.50%) having high to serious
state fragility index (e.g., see Fig. 2c). In contrast, countries with the
monotonically decreasing countries are the most stable with low
state fragility index. In general, monotonically increasing and
decreasing polity failure rates have fewer countries with these risk
structures. FigureS 3–4 illustrate common features in the structural
property of polity failure rates for eight different countries,
irrespectively of the polity score.
The picture that emerges from our socio-political reliability
theory is that U-Shaped polity failure rate has both adaptation and
damage cumulative phases. The size and the magnitude of each of
these regions determine the nature of political instability. That is,
two or more countries with similar features of polity failure rates
can still have different course of socio-political instability
depending on either the magnitude of the risk (see Figs. 4a–b)
and/or the size of certain region (e.g., longer or shorter constant
failure region; see Figs. 3a–b) in the case of bathtub shaped, the
distance between the peak of uni-modal failure rate and the y-axis
(see Figs. 4c–d), convexity and concavity of monotonically
increasing and decreasing hazard rates (see Figs. 3c–d). For
instance, Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad (e.g., see Fig. 3a), Comoros,
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia (e.g., see Fig. 3b),
Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone are
classified as having U-shaped risks of polity change. However,
the socio-political environments such level of political factionalism,
economic conditions, and structural details are different. Countries
such as Burkina Faso, Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia,
Morocco, and Mozambique, for example, have shorter left tail
(decreasing failure rate) followed by a longer constant failure than
other countries within this cliometric space of shape parameters
(see Figs. 3a–b). These properties consistently capture most of the
political behaviors in many of these countries. Gambia with longer
constant polity failure rate, for example, had a democratic polity
that lasted for forty years before becoming an autocracy in recent
Figure 4. Polity Failure Rates. The figures show different properties for polity failure rates using estimated parameters and data sampled from
eight different countries: (a) Tanzania with st~19:26, at~0:8893, bt~1:06; (b) Madagascar with sm~8:15, am~0:8063, bm~0:9839; (c) South Africa
with ssa~3:11|10{6, asa~0:1042, bsa~71:07; and (d) Guinea with sg~0:9487, ag~0:4285, bg~11:04, respectively. Madagascar and Tanzania
exhibit monotonically decreasing, and South Africa and Guinea have uni-modal polity failure rates, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015169.g004
Sociopolitical Reliability and (In)stabilities
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carefully liberalize their regimes. Other features of polity failure
rates exhibiting similar socio-political interpretations were sup-
ported by microscopic processes. For instance, the socio-political
conditions in Zimbabwe (e.g., see Fig. 3d) continue to deteriorate
as illustrated by monotonically increasing polity failure rates and
as a result the risk of polity change continues to increase. On the
other hand, because of the longer constant rate region in the case
of Libya, the socio-political condition is relatively stable as
compared to Zimbabwe (see Figs. 3c–d). In contrast, we observed
that countries with monotonically decreasing rates have lower rate
of political instability. Countries that exhibit this property tend to
be politically stable. For example, the political conditions in
Madagascar and Tanzania have been relatively stable as captured
by the monotone decrease in the polity failure rate (e.g., see
Figs. 4a–b). Interestingly, South Africa has an uni-modal polity
failure rate. However, its functional signature is closely similar to
that of monotonically decreasing failure rate with a steep initial
increase. In the period leading to the unbanning of the ANC, the
release of Nelson Mandela, and the repeal of apartheid policy,
there was heightening risk of possible political unrests and changes
leading to policies similar to the redistributive policies that were
adopted by Zimbabwe after its independence. However, South
Africa has been relatively stable since the apartheid era.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we find that the shift away from autocratic forms
of governance in Africa provides strong evidence of the
relationships between political violence and instability and
democratization; and structural properties of the polity failure
rates provide a mean to characterizing the risk of political
instability in African countries, and other developing countries.
Future research could illustrate whether greater understanding of
the instantaneous behaviors of polity change coupled with regime
type and other socio-political and economic factors can be used to
design preventive and effective policies and/or mitigate political
instability. An extension of our model using repairable system
reliability theory with decision models may allow us to develop
effective policies that minimize the cost of de-consolidating
political institutions and the heightening risks of state failure, civil
conflict and unrest.
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